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portional hazards model to investigate propositions 
from rightholder groups about the factors that moti-
vate takedowns: these include concerns about com-
mercial substitution; artistic/moral concerns; cultural 
differences between firms; and YouTube uploader 
practices. The main finding is that policy concerns 
frequently raised by rightholders are not associated 
with statistically significant patterns of action. For 
example, the potential for reputational harm from 
parodic use does not appear to predict takedown be-
havior. Nor does commercial popularity of the original 
music track trigger a systematic response from right-
holders. Instead, music genre and production values 
emerge as significant factors. We suggest that evolv-
ing policy on intermediary liability - for example with 
respect to imposing filtering systems (automatically 
ensuring “stay-down” of potentially infringing con-
tent) - should be carefully evaluated against evidence 
of actual behavior, which this study shows may differ 
materially from stated policy positions.
Abstract:  What factors lead a copyright owner 
to request removal of potentially infringing user-gen-
erated content? So-called “notice-and-takedown” 
measures are provided in the United States under 
Section 512 of the U.S. Copyright Act (as amended by 
the Digital Millennium Copyright Act 1998) and en-
abled in the European Union under the Directive on 
Electronic Commerce (2000/31/EC). While the com-
bination of limiting liability (“safe harbor”) and notice-
and-takedown procedures was originally conceived 
as a means of balancing innovation with the inter-
ests of rightholders, there has been limited empiri-
cal study regarding their effects. This research inves-
tigates, for the first time, the factors that motivate 
takedown of user-generated content by copyright 
owners. We study takedowns within an original data-
set of 1,839 YouTube music video parodies observed 
between January 2012 and December 2016. We find 
an overall rate of takedowns within the sample of 
32.9% across the 4-year period. We use a Cox pro-
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A. Introduction
1 When Internet users combine, remix, mash-up or 
parody existing cultural materials, they may infringe 
the copyright of the owners in the original work. 
Two sets of legal norms interact in determining 
the availability of such user-generated content 
on Internet platforms.1 The first set are based on 
international agreements, which define the exclusive 
rights under copyright law and restrict possible 
exceptions that may permit derivative re-use.2 
The second set consist of rules about the liability 
of intermediaries on whose services such materials 
may be communicated. While the latter rules vary 
by jurisdiction (and can be copyright-specific, or 
applicable to issues such as terrorism, hate speech, 
or sexual abuse), in practice the great majority of 
global requests for removing infringing content are 
based on the formal notice-and-takedown regime 
established by the United States Digital Millennium 
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1 Definitional note on “Internet platforms”: The safe harbor 
for internet intermediaries is defined in the United States 
under Section 512 of the U.S. Copyright Act (as amended 
by the Digital Millennium Copyright Act – DMCA 1998) 
for “Online Service Providers” and in the European Union 
under the E-Commerce Directive for “Information Society 
Services”. Both legislations were conceived in a pre-social 
media world where the Internet Service Provider (ISP) was 
the technological orientation point. In recent regulatory 
efforts, the European Commission has used the term 
“online platforms” (Commission Communication: Stepping 
up the EU’s efforts to tackle illegal content online, MEMO-
17-3522, Brussels, 28 September 2017). Jurisprudence has 
found it easier to develop the wider concept of internet 
intermediaries in the context of Article 11 IPRED (IPR 
Enforcement Directive 2004/48/EC) and Article 8(3) InfoSoc 
Directive (2001/29/EC). The Court of Justice of the European 
Union (CJEU) defines an intermediary indistinctly for 
online and offline contexts: “for an economic operator to 
fall within the classification of ‘intermediary’ […], it must 
be established that it provides a service capable of being 
used by one or more persons in order to infringe one or 
more intellectual property rights, but it is not necessary 
that it maintains a specific relationship with that or those 
persons” – see Tommy Hilfiger (C-494/15, at 23) and UPC 
Telekabel (C-414/12, at 32 and 35).
2 According to Art. 9(2), Berne Convention for the Protection 
of Literary and Artistic Works 1886, Art. 9(2) exceptions 
to the exclusive rights in national laws are required to be 
specific, non-prejudicial to the author, and not in conflict 
with normal exploitation (the so-called “three-step-
test”). The latest version of the Berne Convention is the 
Paris Act 1971, as amended in 1979. All EU countries are 
members, and the US acceded to Berne in 1989. In 1994, 
the Berne Convention (with the exception of Art. 6bis on 
“moral rights”) was incorporated into the WTO Agreement 
on Trade-related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights 
(TRIPS). The World Trade Organization (WTO) currently has 
164 member countries (as of 29 July 2016), making Berne 
copyright norms binding on most of the world.
Copyright Act (DMCA 1998).3
2 The owner of a copyright work may tolerate a 
derivative use or may act to remove infringing 
content, bearing resource costs associated with 
issuing a notice. Due to the complexity of the 
media ecosystem in which user-generated content 
is produced, rightholders are faced with a difficult 
decision about whether and when to act. Particularly 
in the case of owners of large catalogues of material 
(such as major record labels), the cost of policing 
and requesting removal of infringing content may 
exceed the benefits of doing so. Rightholders must 
decide which content they will expend resources 
protecting, and which types of potential infringement 
they should most aggressively pursue. For example, 
should mash-ups or parodies be approached in the 
same way as incidents of outright piracy? If not, 
where do copyright owners draw the line and what 
factors in particular trigger a removal request?
3 In 2012, some rightholders were opposed to a UK 
Government proposal to introduce a new copyright 
exception for the purposes of parody, caricature 
and pastiche. They argued that such an exception 
would potentially cause substitution, deprive 
them of licensing revenue and damage the artistic 
integrity of works. Here, we analyze the pattern of 
takedowns over a 4-year period, to test whether 
rightholders act(ed) in ways consistent with policy 
statements. Do economic or moral rights concerns 
guide rightholder takedown behavior? And what 
changes, if any, arise from the introduction of a new 
copyright exception?4
4 Our analysis of rightholder behavior complements 
and offers a new perspective on recent empirical 
work assessing the appropriateness of notice-and-
takedown procedures as a means of balancing 
the interests of rightholders, innovative services 
and citizens.5 We find that our efforts to discern 
3 According to Google’s transparency report, Google has 
received in total more than 3bn copyright takedown 
requests (available at: <https://transparencyreport.google.
com/copyright/overview>, last accessed 20 October 2017). 
Personal communication from a senior counsel of Google 
indicated that 99% where submitted as a request using 
the DMCA formalities. This was regardless of whether the 
country in which the request was filed prescribed these 
formalities or had any safe harbor laws. See the Canadian 
case of Google Inc. v. Equustek Solutions Inc. (2017 SCC 34) for 
forensic details of Google’s takedown procedures.
4 Digital literacy is frequently characterised as a requirement 
for successful engagement in 21st century political life. See 
W.L. Bennett, Changing citizenship in the digital age, in 
Civic life online: Learning how digital media can engage youth 
(MIT University Press 2008), pp. 1-24.
5 Urban, Karaganis and Schofield found that automated 
takedown systems leave little room for human review, 
with nearly 30% of a randomized sample of 1,826 takedown 
requests during a six months period in 2013 assessed as being 
of questionable validity. J. Urban, J. Karaganis, B. Schofield. 
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rightholder behavior are complicated by the 
existence of automated and opaque systems for 
detection and removal of content. This makes it 
difficult to study and evaluate takedown behavior.
5 Our empirical approach consists of a longitudinal 
cohort analysis of 1,839 user-generated music video 
parodies hosted on video sharing platform YouTube. 
The data were initially collected in January 2012 
as part of a consultation carried out by the UK 
Intellectual Property Office.6 While the original 
research was designed to assess the economic effects 
of introducing a copyright exception for parody 
in the UK (the political context of the Hargreaves 
Review7 is explained in section C below), the further 
assessment of parody in the context of “takedown” 
practices offers an opportunity to take into account 
wider cultural, social and political features of those 
videos. Parody is controversial, because while it 
is recognized as engaging fundamental norms of 
freedom of expression, the creation of a successful 
parody necessarily draws upon and may copy 
aspects of an original work. This makes our sample 
unrepresentative of user-generated content as a 
whole, but usefully relevant to the study of takedown 
behavior.8
Notice and takedown in everyday practice. Project report 
2016. (Available at: <https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.
cfm?abstract_id=2755628>, last accessed 29/09/2017). See 
also P. J. Heald, How Notice-and-Takedown Regimes Create 
Markets for Music on Youtube: An Empirical Study, 83 
UMKC L. Rev. 313, 328 (2014) and D. Seng, “Who Watches 
the Watchmen?” An Empirical Analysis of Errors in DMCA 
Takedown Notices (2015), available at SSRN: <https://ssrn.
com/abstract=2563202>, last accessed 20/10/2017).
6 The parody research study consisted of three distinct 
Independent Reports for the UK Intellectual Property Office (2013) 
commissioned in the context of the implementation of the 
Hargreaves Review of Intellectual Property and Growth 
(2011): (1) K. Erickson, Copyright and the Economic Effects 
of Parody: an empirical study on music parody videos on 
YouTube; (2) D. Mendis, M. Kretschmer, The Treatment 
of Parodies under Copyright Law in Seven Jurisdictions: a 
comparative review of the underlying principles; and (3) 
a synthetic summary applying the identified legal factors 
to the empirical findings, thus offering a range of policy 
options. The studies were used in the UK Government’s 
preparatory documents for legislation implementing the 
recommendation (Hargreaves Review Impact Assessment, 
BIS1057, 2012, Copyright exception for parody, p. 10).
7 I. Hargreaves, Digital Opportunity – A Review of Intellectual 
Property and Growth (2011) (Available at: <https://www.gov.
uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_
data/file/32563/ipreview-finalreport.pdf>, last accessed 
20/10/2017)
8 Campbell v. Acuff-Rose 510 U.S. 569 (1994), at 588: “When 
parody takes aim at a particular original work, the parody 
must be able to “conjure up” at least enough of that original 
to make the object of its critical wit recognizable”. Cf. 
Taking Forward the Gowers Review of Intellectual Property: 
Proposed changes to copyright exceptions, Newport: 
Intellectual Property Office (2008); R. Deazley, Copyright 
and Parody: Taking Backward the Gowers Review?, The 
Modern Law Review, pp. 785-823 (2010).
6 The initial sample of 1,839 parody music videos 
was obtained by searching a list of the top-charting 
music tracks in the UK for the 12 months preceding 
January 2012. Along with information such as the 
number of views, parodic intent and production 
values present in the user-generated parodies, the 
research team also recorded the uniform resource 
locator (URL) of each parody video. An extended 
group of researchers later revisited URLs of user-
generated videos at two intervals: January 2013 and 
December 2016.9 At each interval, the original URLs 
were checked to ascertain whether the video was 
still accessible on the YouTube website and if not, 
the reason for its removal (where this was possible 
to determine).
7 The analysis of information about both parody 
videos and original works enables examination 
of the relationship between risk of takedown and 
features of user-generated parody videos, such as 
its expressive content, genre, production values, 
and country of origin. This offers for the first time 
a window into takedown behavior in the context of 
stated policy concerns of rightholders.
8 The longitudinal aspect of the study enables us to 
further explore the rationales underlying rightholder 
opposition to policy change. An exception for 
“caricature, parody or pastiche” was introduced 
into UK Law with effect from 1 October 2014, in 
the middle of the longitudinal data collection.10 If 
rightholders were not rigorously and systematically 
protecting their copyright from parodic treatment 
prior to the exception, this weakens public policy 
arguments opposed to such an exception. If they did 
not significantly change behavior after introduction 
of an exception, it raises questions about the salience 
of national copyright law for regulating online 
expression.
9 The paper is structured as follows. In Section B, 
we provide an overview of the technical and legal 
context, explaining the emergence of YouTube (and 
its content identification technology) and the status 
of user-generated services under “safe harbor” 
regimes (which have developed into a dominant 
mode of Internet regulation, limiting liability of 
intermediaries under certain conditions).
10 Next, we offer an analysis of the introduction of 
an exception for parody into UK law, following the 
Hargreaves Review of 2011 that recommended a 
suite of copyright reforms aimed at encouraging 
9 We are grateful for research assistance from Hossein Hassani 
and Andrea Varini at Bournemouth University in collecting 
the first wave of takedown data in 2013. The second wave 
of takedown data was added in December 2016 by Sabine 
Jacques and Morten Hviid at the University of East Anglia.
10 The Copyright and Rights in Performances (Quotation and 
Parody) Regulations 2014 No. 2356.
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innovation and growth. In the UK government’s 
evidence-gathering consultation on the proposal to 
create a new “fair dealing” exception for caricature, 
parody or pastiche, certain music rightholders were 
opposed to the plan, arguing that it undermined their 
economic and creative interests. By analyzing these 
policy arguments from rightholders, we identify 
various propositions about expected behavior.
11 Section C identifies and categorizes factors that 
may influence takedown of parody videos. The 
sample selection, variables and analysis methods are 
explained. We broadly classify four groups of factors 
that could influence a takedown: (1) commercial 
factors (including factors intrinsic to the original 
commercial work and its parodies); (2) moral/artistic 
factors; (3) cultural factors; and (4) behavioral 
factors related to the activities of the parodist. A Cox 
proportional hazards analysis model is estimated 
to investigate the impact of parody characteristics 
on the likelihood of removal over time, identifying 
those factors that are statistically significant.
12 In the concluding discussion we explore specifically 
whether and how music rightholders used notice-
and-takedown procedures to protect their interests, 
and whether takedown behavior on YouTube is 
consistent with public opposition to a fair dealing 
parody exception in the UK.
13 This research is the first attempt at a longitudinal 
study of takedown for a cohort of user-generated 
works. The findings make an important advance in 
the empirical understanding of takedown behavior. 
Without understanding how current notice-and-
takedown procedures are being used, it is impossible 
to project how future policy reforms might alter 
the online communication landscape. The findings 
allow us to evaluate legislative pressure to prescribe 
automated notice systems and pre-emptive removal 
(filtering on the basis of content recognition 
technologies, plus “stay-down” obligation once 
an initial takedown request has been made).11 
 
11 British Phonographic Industry, “Urgent Reform” Needed 
to Notice and Takedown as Removal of 200 Millionth 
Illegal Search Result from Google Approaches, 24 March 
2016. Available at: <https://www.recordoftheday.com/
news-and-press/urgent-reform-needed-to-notice-and-
takedown-as-removal-of-200-millionth-illegal-search-
result-from-google-approaches>, accessed 1 July 2017. 
Stakeholder letter, Creative Sector shows united front 
to tackle the value gap: “UUC platforms have become 
major distributors of creative works - all while refusing 
to negotiate fair copyright licenses, if at all, with the right 
holders”, 4 October 2017. Available at: <http://impalamusic.
org/content/creative-sector-shows-united-front-tackle-
value-gap>, accessed 20 October 2017.
B. YouTube as a Research Site: 
Technical and Legal Context
14 Founded in 2005 by former employees of the online 
payment system PayPal, YouTube is the world’s most 
visited online streaming video platform. YouTube 
was initially acquired by Google in 2006 for USD$1.65 
billion and since that time has integrated contextual 
advertising and search technology from its corporate 
owner. As of July 2017, the company claimed 1 billion 
users, making up a third of total global Internet 
traffic.12 Despite the huge visitorship attracted by 
videos on the website, YouTube has not published 
public information about its profitability. In 2009 the 
New York Times estimated that YouTube’s revenues 
might fall anywhere in a range from $200 million 
to $500 million USD per year, with the company 
reported to have reached profitability in 2011.13 In 
a 2016 interview with Fortune, CEO Susan Wojcicki 
stated that “the company is still in investment 
mode” and may not currently be profitable due to 
technological investment and expansion into foreign 
markets.14
15 Initially, YouTube content consisted almost entirely 
of user contributions, and was considered emblematic 
of the “web 2.0” business model, leveraging user-
generated content and social interaction to attract 
a user base.15 Copyright infringement was initially a 
significant problem for the platform. The availability 
of content owned by third parties made YouTube the 
target of copyright infringement lawsuits, notably 
by cable provider Viacom in 2007.16 In Europe, 
YouTube was sued by RTI in 200817 for hosting clips 
and episodes of the Italian Big Brother TV program 
and in France by TF1 in 201218 for hosting clips of 
programs belonging to the French broadcaster. In 
almost all cases (with the exception of the Italian RTI 
case) YouTube has enjoyed immunity from liability 
for infringement by its users because of its status as 
an information service provider (see next section for 
an explanation of so-called “safe harbor” provisions 
12 YouTube in Numbers <https://www.youtube.com/intl/en-
GB/yt/about/press/>, accessed 2 July 2017.
13 Tim Arango, As Rights Clash on YouTube, Some Music 
Vanishes (New York Times, 22 March 2009), available 
at: <http://www.nytimes.com/2009/03/23/business/
media/23warner.html>, accessed 1 July 2017.
14 Leena Rao, “YouTube CEO Says There’s ‘No Timetable’ 
For Profitability”, available at: <http://fortune.
com/2016/10/18/youtube-profits-ceo-susan-wojcicki/>, 
accessed 29 June 2017.
15 J. Burgess and J. Green, YouTube (2009 Polity Press).
16 Viacom International, Inc. v. YouTube, Inc., No. 07 Civ. 2103.
17 Reti Televisive Italiane contro YouTube, Trib. Roma, 24 
novembre 2009, n.54218/08 (It.).
18 TF1, TF1 Video, TF1 droits audiovisuels, LCI and e-TF1 v. YouTube 
(RG: 10/11205), Tribunal de Grande Instance, Paris, 29 May 
2012.
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in the US and EU). In most cases, courts have found 
that due to the volume of material processed by 
platforms such as YouTube, service administrators 
cannot be held liable for unauthorized use without 
obtaining specific knowledge of infringement. 
Claimants have been pointed to the notice-and-
takedown mechanism as a remedy for the removal 
of infringing content on sites like YouTube.
16 Over time, conflict with rightholders has led 
YouTube to develop more sophisticated measures 
for preventing the uploading of copyright material 
in the first place and empowering rightholders to 
locate and remove material hosted by the website 
via its fingerprint matching technology called 
ContentID. This system works by comparing existing 
and newly-uploaded contents to an “index file” of 
video or audio material provided by a rightholder. If 
a user-uploaded video is matched to an audiovisual 
work in the reference file, the appropriate 
rightholder is notified. Rightholders who participate 
in the ContentID system may then choose to i) have 
the video removed, ii) leave the video accessible 
while muting the infringing audio, iii) leave the 
video up and monetize it to collect a share of the 
advertising revenue, or iv) track it and do nothing.19 
Rightholders may issue their own takedown notices 
independently to the website even if they do not 
participate in ContentID.
17 While YouTube has strengthened its ability to 
respond to rightholder complaints, considerable 
amounts of commercial content has appeared on 
the platform through partnerships with traditional 
and emerging media businesses. One of the most 
significant of these partnerships is the VEVO music 
channel, which hosts content licensed from Sony 
Music Entertainment, Universal Music Group, Abu 
Dhabi Media and EMI. The participating music labels 
benefit from a revenue share model that divides the 
proceeds earned from contextual advertising, pre-
roll video advertising, merchandise, and iTunes 
music downloads. VEVO, along with similar channels 
controlled by Warner music, Sony BMG and Universal 
Music Group, have proven extremely popular; data 
compiled by ratings research company ComScore 
shows that commercial music videos remain the 
most popular type of content on the platform, 
accounting for more than 180 million unique 
monthly viewers in the USA, and making up half of 
the largest channels in the top ten by viewership.20 
19 YouTube, How Does ContentID Work? <https://support.
google.com/youtube/answer/2797370?hl=en-GB>, accessed 
1 July 2017.
20 ComScore, Top 10 YouTube Partner Channels By Unique 
Viewers February 2016 <https://www.comscore.com/
Insights/Rankings/comScore-Releases-February-2016-US-
Desktop-Online-Video-Rankings>, accessed 2 July 2017.
18 The popularity of commercial music video content, 
combined with the large volume of user-generated 
content on YouTube, makes it a compelling site to 
study the effects of derivative use such as parody. 
YouTube’s business model, which depends equally 
on traditional and user-generated content, locates 
it in a precarious position; on one hand needing to 
placate rightholders concerned about the integrity 
and commercial viability of their licensed content, 
and on the other hand requiring participation from 
users who demand the ability to use and remix 
copyright material in new ways. This dilemma 
remains a source of conflict between the various user 
communities and content creators on the service, 
with copyright law providing a general framework 
in which conflicts are resolved.
C. Status of online intermediaries
19 We now review briefly the legal status of online 
intermediaries under copyright law and examine the 
notice-and-takedown mechanism that rightholders 
can employ to remove unwanted infringing content 
from services such as YouTube.
20 A so-called “safe harbor” for “Online Service 
Providers” that offers immunity from claims to 
copyright infringements under certain conditions 
was first introduced in the United States under 
Section 512 of the U.S. Copyright Act (as amended by 
the Digital Millennium Copyright Act – DMCA 1998).21
21 Section 512 specifies a formal procedure under which 
service providers need to respond expeditiously to 
requests from copyright owners to remove material. 
Rightholders who wish to have content removed 
must provide information “reasonably sufficient to 
permit the service provider to locate the material” 
(such as a URL) and warrant that the notifying 
party is authorized to act on behalf of the owner 
of an exclusive right that is allegedly infringed. 
The practice is known as “notice-and-takedown”. 
Importantly, “counter notice” procedures are also 
specified under which alleged infringers are notified 
that material has been removed and can request 
reinstatement.
22 Similarly, under the EU Directive on Electronic 
Commerce (2000/31/EC) hosts of content uploaded 
by users will be liable only upon obtaining knowledge 
of the content and its illegality.  But unlike the 
DMCA, the E-Commerce Directive does not regulate 
the procedure of receiving the necessary knowledge 
but leaves this up to the Member States. Husovec 
(2017) summarizes the position concisely: “The case-
law of the CJEU only requires that the perspective 
21 See 17 U.S.C. §§ 512, 1201-1205 (2000).
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of a ‘diligent economic operator’ is decisive. The 
constructive knowledge can be obtained in any 
situation, including, as a result of an investigation 
undertaken on the provider’s own initiative, as well 
as a situation in which the operator is notified of the 
existence of such activity or information, but perhaps 
not sufficient to constitute actual knowledge.”22
23 In the majority of cases dealing with copyright 
infringement, YouTube has been deemed by courts 
in the USA and Europe to fall within the definition 
of a Service Provider benefitting from exclusion 
from liability for copyright infringement. Both 
the DMCA and the E-Commerce Directive place 
the burden of responsibility on rightholders to 
identify infringing material and notify the service 
provider of its presence. In order to comply with 
these provisions across different jurisdictions, 
YouTube has invested significantly in developing 
an online system to receive and respond to notice-
and-takedown requests from rightholders. At the 
same time, the platform also discourages users from 
uploading infringing material, and polices remove 
repeat infringers from their revenue-sharing 
partnership status and accounts.
24 By placing the burden of policing copyright 
infringement on the shoulders of individual 
copyright owners rather than on network service 
providers, jurisdictions such as the USA and the EU, 
which have adopted these safe harbor provisions 
aim to enable early-stage innovation on the Internet, 
limiting the costs of copyright enforcement. 
However, the present balance of responsibility 
has fallen under criticism. Rightholders have 
protested that this legislation burdens them with 
disproportionate costs, and that intermediaries – 
possessed of access to digital technologies and user 
data – should be obliged to do more to proactively 
find and eliminate infringing content. On the other 
hand, online free speech advocates have protested 
that the notice-and-takedown mechanism is 
open to abuse by parties who wish to suppress 
unpopular and dissenting speech, by using the 
copyright infringement claim as an excuse to force 
intermediaries to remove content.23 While notice-
and-takedown is an effective measure to stop 
direct piracy of content, neither rightholders nor 
Internet intermediaries have developed due process 
for making judgments about “fair” derivative or 
transformative uses. Understaffed and risk-averse, 
online platform operators may simply choose to 
comply with a takedown notice, rather than risk safe 
harbor protection by standing up for a user who may 
22 M. Husovec, Injunctions Against Intermediaries in the European 
Union, Cambridge University Press (2017), p. 53 (analyzing 
L’Oréal and Others, Case C-324/09).
23 J. Miller, Fair Use through the Lenz of §512 of the DMCA: 
A Preemptive Defense to a Premature Remedy?, Iowa Law 
Review (2010), 95, 1697-1729.
indeed benefit from a copyright exception.
25 Takedowns of apparently fair dealing derivative 
works have proven particularly controversial in 
recent years. Under section 512(c) of the DMCA, a 
takedown notice must contain a statement by the 
copyright holder of a good faith belief that there is 
no legal basis for the infringing use identified by the 
complaint. Subsequently, US courts have found that 
complainants may have an obligation to consider 
fair use before issuing such takedown notices, or 
face liability for misrepresentation of infringement. 
Currently, users who are unhappy about the removal 
of their videos from YouTube may file a counter-
notification consisting of a warranty that they are 
legally entitled to make use of the work, however, 
small-scale users may be deterred from doing so 
because of confusion or fear of further legal action 
by rightholders.24
26 In the case of Lenz v. Universal Music Corp.,25 a 
California District Court upheld a complaint that the 
music label had failed to take into account the fair 
use of material when it issued a takedown notice 
to YouTube over a video that the complainant had 
uploaded to the service.  The video, a short clip 
of the complainant’s toddler dancing, triggered 
the takedown request because the song playing 
in the background was Prince’s Let’s Go Crazy, 
owned by Universal Music.  The case highlighted 
an important feature of the existing notice-and-
takedown mechanism: dependency on automated 
“fingerprinting” technology used by rightholders 
to locate infringing material (in this case by Prince) 
can result in false positives that would otherwise be 
covered by fair use. A second issue highlighted by 
this case is that the whim of one artist can generate 
thousands of takedown notices while derivative uses 
of other artists’ work remains untouched26. There is 
no consistently applied set of rules governing the 
removal of derivative online use of copyright work.
27 The proposed EU Directive on Copyright in 
the Digital Single Market (COM(2016) 593 final, 
14.9.2016) introduces a new provision (Article 13) 
that will create (under some readings) an obligation 
for information service providers to prevent the 
availability of infringing works in the first place. 
This new “notice-and-stay-down” obligation has 
24 Fred von Lohman, “YouTube’s Content ID (C)ensorship 
Problem Illustrated”, Electronic Frontier Foundation (2 
March 2010), available online: <https://www.eff.org/
deeplinks/2010/03/youtubes-content-id-c-ensorship-
problem>, accessed 20/10/2017.
25 Lenz v. Universal Music Corp., 572 F. Supp. 2d 1150 (N.D. Cal. 
2008).
26 The particularly aggressive stance of Universal Music 
has been dubbed the “Prince Policy” due to that artist’s 
notoriously strict stance on online use of his work (Miller, 
supra footnote 23).
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been welcomed by rightholders (in particular from 
the music industry) as improving their bargaining 
position vis-à-vis services such as YouTube. The 
wording of Article 13 has been criticized as a 
“censorship filter”, 27 and is close to mandating 
general monitoring (that would be in conflict with 
Article 15 of the E-Commerce Directive and CJEU case 
law).28 This remains a fast moving field of policy.
D. Parody in Copyright Policy: 
The UK Example
28 The original dataset of 1,839 music video parodies 
examined here was collected in the context of the UK 
Hargreaves Review in 2012. The policy consultation 
process provided an opportunity to gather responses 
from rightholders to the proposed copyright 
exception, enabling us to generate propositions 
about expected takedown behavior. This section 
explains the context of Hargreaves’ proposals and 
the responses by music industry rightholders.
29 There have been numerous arguments made in 
support of statutory copyright exceptions for 
parody, such as in the UK.29 The 2006 Gowers 
Review of Intellectual Property recommended 
that the government adopt such an exception on 
the grounds that it would promote the creation of 
valuable new works and reduce transaction costs 
by removing the need for licensing in certain 
cases.30 In his 2011 review, Professor Ian Hargreaves 
similarly recommended the creation of a new fair 
dealing exception for parody, on the grounds that 
allowing unlicensed parody would generate growth 
for UK media industries, and would “encourage 
27 J. Reda, When filters fail: These cases show we can’t trust 
algorithms to clean up the internet (available at: <https://
juliareda.eu/2017/09/when-filters-fail/>, accessed 
20/10/2017).
28 L’Oréal/eBay (C-324/09, 12 July 2011), Sabam/Netlog (C-
360/10, 16 February 2012). For a contrary view, see A. 
Lucas-Schloetter, “Transfer of Value Provisions of the Draft 
Copyright Directive” (March 2017, p. 19). According to Lucas-
Schloetter, the prohibition on general monitoring does not 
apply “when the infringing content to be searched for is 
identified” (available at: <http://www.authorsocieties.eu/
uploads/Lucas-Schloetter%20Analysis%20Copyright%20
Directive%20-%20EN.pdf>, accessed 20/10/2017).
29 In the United States, parodies typically are considered 
as “fair use” under section 107 of the Copyright Act 1976. 
Under the fair use doctrine, factors to consider include 
the purpose and character (e.g. commercial/non-profit 
educational use), substantiality of the portion used, and the 
effect of the use upon the potential market. The case of Acuff 
Rose Inc. v Campbell (510 U.S. 569, 1994) established that the 
“transformative” nature of the parodied work is decisive: 
Does it add “something new, with a further purpose or 
different character, altering the first with new expression, 
meaning or message”?
30 Gowers (2006) 68.
[…] literacy in multimedia expression in ways 
that are increasingly essential to the skills base 
of the economy”.31 Parody is understood to be a 
fundamental part of political and cultural life in the 
UK, with the Government citing its “long and vibrant 
tradition” in UK comedy.32
30 While both the Hargreaves and Gowers reviews 
stressed the generative effects of transformative use 
for the creative industries, some industry groups 
took a strongly opposing stance toward the proposed 
legislation. In response to the Hargreaves Review, 
the Music Publishers Association (MPA) wrote:
The proposed exception for parody would undermine the 
integrity and moral rights of publishers and cut across 
their normal licensing activities, whether for the purpose of 
synchronization or straight forward adaptation of the lyrics 
or musical style. Carving out an exception which meant that 
“parodists” would not have to pay for comic use of musical 
material undermines the business model of a music publisher. 
(MPA 2012)
31 Distilling arguments contained in the 471 industry 
responses published in the Government Consultation 
on the Hargreaves Review, and in particular those 
that opposed the introduction of a copyright 
exception for parody, we identify three common 
concerns on the part of rights owners.33
32 First, certain respondents argued that permitted 
unlicensed parody would deprive rightholders of a 
legitimate stream of licensing revenue.  Wider economic 
interests such as those cited in the Hargreaves 
review, needed to be balanced against the threat 
to licensing revenue earned by rights owners for 
permission to make use a work, including uses that 
might fall under the proposed fair dealing exception 
for parody.  The Design and Artists Collecting 
Society (DACS), which represents the interests 
of visual creators (including photographers and 
graphic illustrators), stated in its response to the 
Hargreaves consultation that, “[r]ightsholders will 
lose an established stream of revenue from the 
licensing of their work for parodies which go beyond 
the established limitations of substantial taking and 
criticism and review” (DACS, 2012: 44).
31 Hargreaves (2011) 50.
32 Intellectual Property Office, Consultation on Copyright 
(2012). Available online: <http://www.ipo.gov.uk/pro-
policy/consult/consult-closed/consult-closed-2011/
consult-2011-copyright.htm>, accessed 20/10/2017.
33 For a discussion of discourse analysis method applied to 
consultation responses, see K. Erickson, User illusion: 
ideological construction of “user generated content” in the 
EC consultation on copyright, Internet Policy Review 3(4), 
pp. 1-19 (2014) (available at: <https://policyreview.info/
articles/analysis/user-illusion-ideological-construction-
user-generated-content-ec-consultation>, accessed 
27/10/17).
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33 The second argument made by rightholders in 
opposition to the proposed parody exception was 
that widespread unlicensed parodies might compete 
unfairly with original works in the marketplace, either 
by substituting for the original, or by causing unwanted 
reputational damage. These two related arguments 
were explored by Rogers34 in a study commissioned 
by Consumer Focus, the UK statutory body that 
represents consumers across regulated markets, 
and they have been cited by commentators on 
both sides of the debate; although Rogers and co-
authors note that there is an absence of empirical 
evidence with which to evaluate these claims. The 
first part of the argument, that unlicensed parody 
might substitute for an original work, seems unlikely 
given the nature of parody: the successful parodist 
must conjure up knowledge of an original work in 
an audience member’s mind in order for the parody 
to be effective, assuming prior knowledge of the 
original work. There is the additional possibility that 
the circulation of a popular parody might stimulate 
consumption of an original work, when new fans of 
the parody are reminded of the original. The second 
part of the argument articulated by Rogers et al – 
that parody might cause reputational harm to an 
original – is difficult to test empirically, although 
there are normative questions to be raised about 
how far copyright protection should impede the free 
flow of market information regarding the quality of 
goods, such as that enabled by neighboring copyright 
exceptions for purposes of criticism and review.
34 A third argument made in opposition to the proposed 
parody exception in the wake of Hargreaves is that 
derogatory treatment of an original by parodists could 
infringe on the original authors’ moral rights. Outlined 
in sections 77-85 of the UK Copyright Design and 
Patents Act (CDPA 1988), moral rights consist of the 
rights of an author to be identified as the creator of 
a work (paternity), to prevent misidentification as 
the author of a work, and to object to derogatory 
treatment of a work that he or she has authored 
(integrity). It is principally the latter that opponents 
argued could be endangered by the introduction of a 
copyright exception for parody. In fact, the wording 
of the proposed parody exception was explicitly 
written so that it shall not infringe on an author’s 
moral right. Nevertheless, it is foreseeable that some 
authors could object to certain parodic treatments of 
their work and may wish to prevent transmission of 
such work by asserting their moral rights.
35 The arguments articulated above are largely 
theoretical – prior to the Hargreaves consultation 
34 M. Rogers, J. Tomalin and R. Corrigan, The economic 
impact of consumer copyright exceptions: A literature 
review, Consumer Focus (2009), (available at: <http://oro.
open.ac.uk/25604/5/The-economic-impact-of-consumer-
copyright-exceptions-Rogers-Tomalin-Corrigan.pdf>, 
accessed 20/10/17).
exercise, no rigorous empirical studies of the 
economic effects of parody existed. Much of the prior 
discussion of parody is either anecdotal, focusing on 
key cases and disputes involving single works, or 
represents the views of industry bodies or collecting 
societies (such as the Music Publishers Association 
and DACS, cited above). If we assume that the 
aggregate views expressed by collective bodies are 
representative of their members’ economic interests 
as a whole, we should expect to find corresponding 
empirical evidence that supports those concerns 
expressed in the published responses to the 
Hargreaves review. For example, if infringement of 
moral rights is a major concern, we should expect 
to see some rightholders systematically withholding 
certain works from parody or objecting to certain 
derogatory types of parodic treatment. Similarly, 
if protecting work from substitution by parodic 
imitators is of concern, we should expect to see 
those parodies that attract significant viewership 
taken down with greater regularity. In the following 
section, we describe the research method used 
to observe rightholder behavior, using data on 
takedowns gathered from music videos and their 
related parodies on YouTube.
E. Research Design and Method
36 We initiated data collection in 2012 for the purposes 
of assessing the economic implications of introducing 
an exception for Parody into UK copyright law. The 
researchers sought to ascertain the quantity of user-
generated parody content on YouTube and review 
their effect on commercial works parodied.35 We 
used the top-100 list of monthly songs tracked by 
the British Charts Company to obtain a list of the 
343 most popular songs released in the UK in the 
previous 12 months. These songs were matched 
with a corresponding licensed music video hosted 
on YouTube (such as via VEVO or other record 
labels’ official channels). As a second step, searches 
for parody videos referencing those commercial 
works were performed by searching for “song name 
+ parody” in YouTube’s internal search engine. The 
researchers located 8,299 user-generated music video 
parodies referencing the original 343 commercial 
music videos. A randomly-selected sample of 1,839 
parodies from within that larger population was 
subjected to closer analysis by human coders to 
determine the nature of the parody, the severity of 
critique, the production values used, and the extent 
35 See K. Erickson, M. Kretschmer and D. Mendis, Copyright 
and the Economic Effects of Parody: An Empirical Study of 
Music Videos on the YouTube Platform and an Assessment 
of the Regulatory Options, Intellectual Property Office 2013 
(available at: <https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/
system/uploads/attachment_data/file/309903/ipresearch-
parody-report3-150313.pdf>, accessed 27/06/17).
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of the original work copied. The research team also 
recorded the location (URL) of each of the initial 
1,839 parody videos to enable future analysis.
37 Following the original collection of data in 2012, it 
was decided to observe the videos again to obtain 
a new perspective on “takedown” policies. For this 
purpose, one year after the original study, in January 
2013, the team re-visited the list of parody URLs to 
check whether those videos were still live on the 
platform or whether they had been removed.36 In 
2016, colleagues at the University of East Anglia 
(UEA) collected an additional wave of takedown 
data based on the original sample, establishing 
which parody videos were still live four years later. 
The two research teams pooled these data together 
(which the UEA team then analyzed for a study on 
cultural diversity).37
38  The two waves of follow-up study allowed inclusion 
of the additional variable of the removal of user-
generated parody videos, first at one year and then 
at four years after they were first observed. In both 
waves, researchers differentiated where possible 
whether the takedown was initiated by a rightholder, 
or whether the video was removed by the uploader 
for unknown reasons (see Table 1).
39 Table 1: Music video parody sample decay rate 
due to takedown 2012-2016
January 2012 January 2013 December 2016
Total Accessible 1839 1471 (79.9%) 1088 (59.2%)
Cumulative 
Taken down for 
copyright (%)
-- 265 (15.5%) 606 (32.9%)
Cumulative 
Taken down 
for unknown 
reason (%)
-- 103 (5.6%) 145 (7.9%)
40 When the dataset was revisited in January 2013, some 
265 (15.5%) of the original 1,839 videos had been 
removed by a likely copyright complaint. This was 
ascertained by checking the notice that appeared in 
front of inaccessible videos. For example, blocked 
videos could indicate that they were “unavailable 
due to a copyright complaint” or “no longer available 
in your territory” (also due to copyright). In 2016 
when researchers Jacques et al re-examined the 
original dataset, they found that an additional 341 
videos had been removed for copyright reasons in 
36 It should be noted that in all waves, researchers checked for 
removed videos using a UK-based IP address. 
37 See S. Jacques, K. Garstka, M. Hviid and J. Street, The Impact 
on Cultural Diversity of Automated Anti-Piracy Systems as 
Copyright Enforcement Mechanisms: An Empirical Study of 
YouTube’s Content ID Digital Fingerprinting Technology, 
SSRN 2017 (available at: <https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=2902714>, accessed 27/06/17).
the intervening period after 2013. The overall yearly 
rate of decay after 2013 is therefore lower, but still 
significant, bringing the total number of accessible 
videos down to 1,088 from the initial 1,839. Some 
145 of the missing videos were removed for reasons 
other than a copyright notice, likely by the uploader 
themselves. These videos are considered separately 
from the instances of copyright takedown and are 
treated as censored in our analysis (see below).
41 Building from policy arguments made by music 
rightholders identified in the preceding section, 
we propose and categorize a range of different 
factors that may influence whether a copyright 
takedown is initiated (see figure 2). The full list of 
variables and their parameters is provided in Annex 
1. Specifically, we identify four groups of factors 
that could influence a takedown: (1) commercial 
factors (including factors intrinsic to the original 
commercial work and its parodies); (2) moral/artistic 
factors; (3) cultural factors; and (4) behavioral factors 
related to the activities of the parodist.
42 Table 2: Factors that may influence takedown of 
parody videos
Commercial factors Cultural factors
Sales rank of original 
Parody views 
Parody production values  
Monetization on parody
Genre: rock 
Genre: Electro 
Genre: Hip hop 
Territory: UK 
Territory: USA 
Major/independent record label
Moral/artistic factors Behavioral factors
Parody type: target 
Parody type: weapon 
Severity of criticism
Copied sound recording 
Copied video recording 
Lack of intent (mislabeled parody) 
Parodist appears on camera 
Gender of parodist
43 Commercial factors. One argument advanced by 
rightholders in opposition to a copyright exception 
for parody focused on the potential for reduced 
commercial revenue from loss of the ability to license 
to parodists. While the music industry and collecting 
societies do not often publish information about the 
frequency of licensing or the agreed terms, we can 
assess this claim within our study by considering 
commercial features intrinsic to parodies. In 
particular, we examine whether a parody video is 
accompanied by monetization in the form of pre-
roll or mid-roll advertisements, and whether it 
was created with low or high production values,38 
indicating commercial quality. We also include the 
popularity of the parody video in our analysis, using 
the number of views originally measured in January 
38 Production values were recorded by asking human research 
assistants to rate them on a Likert-style scale from 1 (lowest) 
to 5 (highest).
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2012. Based on rightholder statements, we might 
expect higher rates of takedown for parody videos 
with higher production values and popularity, 
reflecting concern over substitution and potential 
loss of licensing revenue anticipated by rightholders. 
YouTube carries content of varying quality, ranging 
from purely amateur, non-commercial video to 
semi-professional and commercial video produced 
by entrepreneurs and firms. Since this latter group 
potentially derives revenue from their activities 
on and off YouTube, it is reasonable to expect that 
rightholders would target these potential licensees 
more readily than non-commercial users, where the 
likelihood of paying for use of an original work is 
low.
44 In addition to factors intrinsic to parodies 
themselves, we also consider the commercial appeal 
of the underlying musical work. In the current study, 
the feature of the original music track and video that 
we examine is sales popularity of the original work 
(based on its position and duration in the top-100 
UK charts). The variable “sales rank” captures the 
relative position and duration of the original song 
on the UK top-100 music charts in 2011.
45 Moral / artistic factors. An additional set of arguments 
raised by rightholders in opposition to a parody 
exception related to artistic qualities of the parodies 
themselves. Related to the commercial factors 
above, one source of opposition from rightholders 
was the apprehension that negative parodies 
could impact the market for an original work by 
harming the reputation of the artist or the work 
itself. Reputational harm in the market is difficult 
to measure; the impact of a negative review may 
take years to propagate and produce an effect. Our 
data provide an opportunity to detect whether 
rightholders are concerned by reputational damage, 
independent of whether such damage actually 
materializes. Approximately 33% of the parodies in 
the original dataset were “target” parodies, meaning 
that they explicitly took as an object of ridicule the 
original work or its creator. By contrast, “weapon” 
parodies use an original piece of content to draw 
attention to some third-party individual or issue. We 
include dummy variables for both types to analyze 
the importance of parodic intent. If rightholders 
are concerned about the potential for reputational 
harm produced by online parody, we should expect 
to see that they issue more takedowns for negative 
“target” parodies. Another factor relates to the 
moral right that the original artist may have to 
object to a derogatory treatment of their work. It 
is difficult to assess whether a parody produced 
under a fair dealing exception such as that available 
in the UK could infringe the moral rights of artists. 
However, it is possible that moral rights concerns 
drive rightholder behavior.39 To explore this, we 
analyze a subsample of parodies containing the most 
explicitly negative messages (severity of critique) to 
test whether this has a statistically significant effect 
on the likelihood of a takedown.
46 Cultural factors. This group of factors relate to 
differences in the legal culture between territories, 
as well as differences in the creative practices 
of specific musical genres or businesses (music 
labels), which may influence the observed pattern 
of takedown. Since the UK did not have a statutory 
exception for parody until October 2014, the 
availability of the fair use defense to parodists in 
the USA may be expected to produce a difference 
in the level of tolerance for parodies reflecting the 
different legal culture of the two countries. To assess 
this influence, we record and include the national 
territory of the music publisher in our analysis, using 
a dummy variable for original songs originating in 
the UK. It has been widely observed in scholarship on 
media production that different mediums, and even 
sub-genres are characterized by differing production 
practices, in particular relating to tolerance of 
sampling or borrowing from pre-existing works.40 To 
assess whether genre has an influence on likelihood 
of takedown, we include dummy variables in our 
analysis for Rock, Electronic and Hip Hop music, 
with “Pop” as the reference category. Finally, the 
business practices of specific music labels may be 
a factor in whether parody videos are taken down. 
Specific businesses may have internal policies that 
are more or less tolerant of online uses. A young, 
up-and-coming independent label might actively 
encourage YouTubers to parody their artists’ works, 
while a more established corporate player might be 
more restrictive, for example. To capture potential 
effects from individual music labels, we include 
a dummy variable for songs owned by major, as 
opposed to independent music labels.41
47 Behavioral factors. This group of factors relates to 
the decision making and behavior of the parodist/
uploader when creating and sharing their video. One 
important set of factors relates to the underlying 
39 And indeed, this is possible given the anecdotal reports 
of displeasure by specific artists concerning online uses 
of their works. See Miller and the “Prince effect” (supra 
footnote 26).
40 See A. Sinnreich. Mashed up: Music, technology, and the rise 
of configurable culture. University of Massachusetts Press 
(2010), 107-123.
41 Major labels are defined as belonging to one of the “big 
three” - Universal Music Group, Sony Music Entertainment, 
and Warner Music Group, or their sub-labels (including 
Atlantic, Capitol, Parlophone and EMI, among others). The 
authors are grateful to Matthew Sag at Loyola University 
Chicago for his suggestion to include possible label effects in 
the analysis. The initial collection of music label information 
was carried out by Sabine Jacques, with additional coding by 
the authors.
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material directly copied or added by the parodist 
when making their video. In our initial sample, 
many parodists copied portions of the original 
composition or sound recording in their uploaded 
video. A smaller group of parodists copied the 
original music video itself, although most parodists 
in our sample chose to create new video content as 
well as lyrics to accompany their derivative work. 
This is unsurprising, as YouTube is primarily a 
platform for video expression and uploaders may 
lack the musical ability to perform and record a new 
sound recording riffing on an original song without 
directly copying it. Another behavioral factor relates 
to the parodic intent – or lack of discernible intent 
– of the uploader. As previously discussed, the 
majority of videos corresponded to two known types 
of parody: “target” (which takes aim at the original 
work) and “weapon” (which uses a work to draw 
attention to a different social issue or phenomenon). 
However, a further 13% of parodies in the initial 
sample had no discernible focus of critique, even 
though the parodist had tagged their uploaded video 
with the keyword “parody”, making it detectable to 
our initial sampling method. We record this lack of 
parodic intent and include it as a dummy variable 
in the analysis, with the reference category being 
all other parodies where a focus of critique was 
evident. Finally, we record and include variables 
which capture the style of address and gender of 
the parody performer (female solo compared to male 
solo and mixed groups).
F. Analysis and Discussion
48 The data on YouTube takedowns, comprised of 1,839 
cases, presents two challenges for analysis. One 
challenge relates to censoring of the data: while the 
observation period took place over 72 months, not all 
takedowns that may eventually occur are captured in 
our study. A second challenge is one of survivorship 
bias introduced by the removal of the most egregious 
infringing parodies immediately upon upload. 
In order to address these challenges, we perform 
a Cox proportional hazards analysis to examine 
the effect of covariates on time-to-removal.42 This 
allows us to identify which variables are associated 
with an increase or decrease in the risk that a 
given user-generated video will be taken down. 
The dependent variable (event) in the analysis was 
the detection of a takedown (expressed as a binary 
variable: 1=yes, 0=no). Covariates include features 
of the parody video itself as well as features of the 
42 For further discussion of suitability of the Cox proportional 
hazards model to analysis of cohort data in an organizational 
setting, see A. Scherer, N.V. Wünderlich and F. Von 
Wangenheim, The Value of Self-Service: Long-Term Effects 
of Technology-Based Self-Service Usage on Customer 
Retention. MIS Quarterly 2015, 39(1).
original commercial work (full descriptive statistics 
are provided in Annex 1). The time variable is the 
maximum number of months a video “survived” 
from upload to detection of a takedown.
49 The results of the Cox regression analysis are 
presented in Annex 2. Results are reported as hazard 
ratios, indicating an increased risk of takedown 
when the ratio is greater than 1, and a reduced risk 
when the ratio is less than 1. Columns 1-4 present 
the results for each of the groups of covariates, and 
column 5 presents the model with all main variables 
included. The “target” variable is not included in 
specification 5 due to multicollinearity with the 
other variable of interest, “severity of critique” (all 
severely critical parodies were target parodies).
Discussion 1: Commercial factors
50 In the preceding section, we identified one set of 
factors related to claims by rightholders that parody 
harms the commercial market for their works. To 
assess these claims, we analyze variables related to 
production values, popularity and commercial sales 
of original works to assess whether these factors 
influence the probability of rightholder action. 
A first observation from the analysis is that the 
commercial success (sales rank) of the underlying 
commercial release does not appear to have a 
significant impact on rightholder takedown activity. 
A second commercial concern for rightholders is 
the possibility for substitution by parodic works, 
which might compel them to remove parodies most 
popular with viewers. We observe a significantly 
negative effect for number of views on the risk of a 
takedown. This means that more popular videos (as 
measured in 2012) had a lower risk of being removed 
by rightholders.
51 A second, related concern for rightholders is the 
potential for lost licensing revenue from parody 
videos that have commercial potential. The proxy 
variable used to capture commercial potential in 
this analysis is the level of production values in 
the parody (initially measured by human coders 
using a Likert-style rating from 1-5). Parody videos 
with higher production values may reflect creators 
with access to more resources and more funding 
compared to amateur producers. Overall, higher 
production values reduced the risk of a takedown 
compared to videos with average or low production 
values. There are several potential explanations for 
this result: commercially-minded YouTubers may 
benefit from pre-existing licensing agreements (for 
example through membership in multi-channel 
networks); highly skilled parodists may benefit 
from knowledge which helps avoid automated 
takedown (for example by performing their own 
musical rendition to accompany the parody); or, 
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rightholders may be engaged in a form of brand 
management, trimming videos that they feel do 
not meet standards of quality aligned with their 
objectives as entertainment brands.
Discussion 2: Artistic characteristics
52 In the preceding section, we characterized two 
claims originating from rightholders that the 
artistic qualities of a parody might be harmful to 
artists. The first proposition relates to the potential 
for reputation harm arising from negative parodies, 
which target the artist or the original work. Among 
the covariates in Annex 2, we include two dummy 
variables for “weapon” and “target” parodies, to test 
the impact of negatively targeting the original work 
on the risk of a takedown. The reference category is 
all other mislabeled parodies where no clear intent 
could be ascertained. We observe that the effect 
on risk of takedown for both weapon and target 
parodies is negative. It appears that having a clear 
parodic intent, even if critical of the original work, 
benefits the survival of parodies.
53 A second claim was the potential for parodies to 
infringe the moral rights of creators (one rationale 
for curtailing exceptions to copyright). The influence 
of moral rights concerns on the takedown rate is 
complicated by the range of potential objections 
that an author might have to a transformative 
use of their work. We assume that “derogatory 
treatment” in the eyes of a creator is likely to include 
use that de-values the original for a new audience.43 
One possibility is that a parody could be placing a 
work in an objectionable context.44 The variable 
43 Section 80(2)(b) of the UK Copyright, Designs and Patents 
Act 1988 provides that the treatment of a work is derogatory 
“if it amounts to distortion or mutilation of the work or is 
otherwise prejudicial to the honour or reputation of the 
author or director”. Reference to the wording of Art. 6 of 
the Berne Convention suggests that the author can only 
object to distortion, mutilation or modification of her work 
if it is prejudicial to her honor or reputation. Still one UK 
court has given a wide interpretation, considering the 
removal of a forest background from a photograph as a 
derogatory distortion (Delves-Broughton v. House of Harlot Ltd 
[2012] EWPCC 29).
44 An example is the notorious Deckmyn case before the CJEU 
(Case C-201/13) where the rightholders of Suske en Wiske 
hoped to stop a right wing political party from circulating 
a pamphlet that spoofs a famous cartoon cover, but this 
case was decided without reference to moral rights (which 
are not harmonized EU rights). At (27): “It follows that the 
application, in a particular case, of the exception for parody, 
within the meaning of Article 5(3)(k) of Directive 2001/29, 
must strike a fair balance between, on the one hand, the 
interests and rights of persons referred to in Articles 2 
and 3 of that directive, and, on the other, the freedom of 
expression of the user of a protected work who is relying 
on the exception for parody, within the meaning of Article 
5(3)(k).” If a discriminatory message is conveyed “which 
has the effect of associating the protected work with such a 
“severity of critique” was included in column 4. It 
has a significantly negative effect on takedown risk, 
strengthening the interpretation that a clear target 
of attack is more beneficial than having no target 
at all.
Discussion 3: Cultural factors
54 We analyze another set of factors related to the 
cultural context of music production and legal 
culture of the territories of the original artist. A 
significant factor for likelihood of a takedown is the 
genre of the underlying musical work. We find that 
for parodies of rock music, the risk of takedown is 
significantly reduced compared to pop, hip hop, and 
electronic music. This finding remains stable and 
significant across different specifications. The result 
is surprising, counterintuitive to existing scholarship 
which suggests greater tolerance for sampling and 
re-use in art forms such as hip hop music. Our result 
may reflect an overall permissive tendency in less 
popular, traditional music. Rock music right holders 
may not be interested in enforcing copyright on 
YouTube due to a focus on traditional commercial 
channels of distribution. Other than musical genre, 
the other main cultural factor influencing takedown 
was territory of the original artist. For original works 
by artists based in the USA, the risk of takedown was 
significantly lower than for the UK and Europe. This 
may reflect the influence of fair use, or it may reflect 
greater tolerance on the part of American music 
rightholders to online user-generated expressive 
practices.
Discussion 4: Behavioral factors
55 Finally, we analyze factors originating from the 
behavior of parodists when creating and uploading 
their derivative works. One significant factor in this 
group is a lack of parodic intent on the part of the 
uploader. The result is positively significant (at the 
p<.01 level). This result may reflect elimination of 
parodies where the uploader has tried to disguise 
their use as a parody. These could be straight 
copies of the original music video or could consist 
of “karaoke” covers. Lack of parodic intent is also 
correlated with lower production values, so the 
increase in takedown rate may also reflect brand 
management “pruning” by copyright holders 
message” (at 29) (a case which it is for the national court to 
assess), (30) “attention should be drawn to the principle of 
non-discrimination based on race, color and ethnic origin, 
as was specifically defined in Council Directive 2000/43/
EC of 29 June 2000 implementing the principle of equal 
treatment between persons irrespective of racial or ethnic 
origin (OJ 2000 L 180, p. 22), and confirmed, inter alia, by 
Article 21(1) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the 
European Union.”
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unhappy with poor-quality uses.
56 This group of factors includes measures of the 
amount of borrowing from original works (copied 
video or sound recording). Unsurprisingly, we find 
a significant positive relationship between the 
presence of an original sound recording and risk of a 
takedown. When parodists borrowed the underlying 
recorded track from a commercial work, their video 
was more likely to be rapidly taken down. Borrowing 
the original video in a parody also increased risk of 
takedown, but less significantly. This may reflect 
the immediate detectability of copied videos, with 
the most egregious copies taken down immediately, 
leaving only more robust derivative works that 
withstood subsequent takedowns. The impact of 
artistic borrowing on takedown rate may generally 
be explained by the use of ContentID by rightholders 
to automatically locate and policy infringing material 
(sound and video content).
57 Table 3: Summary of factors influencing takedown 
of parody videos (waves 1 & 2)
Commercial factors Cultural factors
Sales rank of original 
Parody Views .864*** 
Parody production values .898*** 
Monetization on parody
Genre: rock .560*** 
Genre: Electro 
Genre: Hip hop 
Territory: UK 
Territory: USA .724*** 
Major record label?
Moral/artistic factors Behavioral factors
Parody type: target 
Parody type: weapon 
Severity of criticism
Copied sound recording 1.237*** 
Copied video recording 
Lack of intent (mislabeled parody 
Parodist appears on camera 
Gender of parodist
Note: Significant variables reported as hazard ratios. Significance levels: *** p<0.01, 
** p<0.05, * p<0.1
G. Conclusion
58 This paper has examined the rate of copyright 
takedown of parody music videos to assess different 
claims made by rightholders about the features of 
parody that they find threatening to the artistic 
integrity and commercial exploitation of their work. 
Based on public policy statements, we expected to 
observe a higher probability of takedown for variables 
related to commercial substitution, as rightholders 
exercised their copyright to protect the market 
value of their works. Considering artistic factors, we 
expected to observe rightholders exercising their 
copyright to protect the artistic integrity of their 
expressions and reputation of artists.
45 Supra footnote 8: D. Mendis and M. Kretschmer (2013), p. 19.
59 Other than removal of direct forms of copying, 
rightholders do not appear to be acting in a way that 
corresponds to public statements about the artistic 
or commercial harm posed by parody works. One 
counterintuitive finding is that rightholders are not 
targeting the most popular or highest production 
value parodies, but appear to be doing the opposite. 
This contradicts the expected result, which is that 
rightholders should be concerned about substitution, 
and that they should seek to suppress commercial-
quality derivative uses in favor of licensing use 
of their material. It is likely that the ability of 
rightholders to track and monetize derivative uses 
of their copyright material via ContentID partially 
explains the observed result. High-quality and 
popular parodies might remain live on the platform 
because rightholders have determined that the 
revenue gains from monetizing those unauthorized 
parodies weigh against any potentially negative 
effects such as substitution.
60 The use of ContentID monetization does not explain 
the disproportionate rate of takedown of parodies 
with lower production values, which is significant 
across specifications. Poor quality may be linked 
to a lack of copyright awareness on the part of 
uploaders. Parodists with less skill may be more 
likely to directly copy a sound recording, making 
their output more easily detectable by rightholders. 
The significance of direct copying on the risk of a 
takedown reinforces this possibility. Rightholders 
and their representatives may also be involved in 
brand management in their online takedown policy 
– leaving up those videos that are popular or reflect 
well on the artist’s brand, while seeking to remove 
those that tarnish the artist due to their amateurish 
production values. Further research is needed to 
ascertain why high production values appear to 
be an important factor in why certain derivative 
uses might escape a takedown request, other 
factors being equal. Qualitative features of parodic 
treatment (such as the extent of transformation, and 
if what was taken from the original was necessary) 
are commonly considered in legal determinations of 
infringement.<?> The empirical findings suggest that 
this is also important in commercial practice.
61 A second finding of our study is that rightholders 
do not appear to be concerned with the expressive 
content of parodies, even when they explicitly 
target or criticize the original artist or work. This 
contradicts the expectation, based on published 
opposition by rightholder groups, that widespread 
parody threatens the integrity of works and 
therefore the moral rights of creators. In our sample, 
the “severity” of a parody significantly reduced the 
risk of a copyright takedown. The outcome suggests 
46 Supra footnote 10: Heald (2014); Seng (2015); Urban, 
Karaganis, Schofield (2016).
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that rightholders are more concerned with direct 
copying and with commercial licensing than with 
artists’ moral rights.
62 The results obtained in this study suggest potential 
directions for future research. We have presented 
data on takedowns and rightholder behavior for a 
limited sample of internet content. While our results 
invite comparisons with other studies of notice-
and-takedown,<?> in fact user-generated parody 
videos are a unique form of expression subject to 
dynamics that may be different in other domains 
where rightholders seek to protect their work from 
direct infringement. Comparative research might 
examine other communities where consumers 
appropriate commercial work to generate new 
expressions, for example fan fiction or machinima 
creator communities.
63 The UK eventually introduced a new fair dealing 
exception for the purposes of parody, caricature 
and pastiche with effect from 1 October 2014. In its 
technical review of draft legislation, the Intellectual 
Property Office outlined its rationale, stating, 
“adopting this exception will give people in the UK’s 
creative industries greater freedom to use others’ 
works for parody purposes. Drafting this as a fair 
dealing exception […] is intended to allow creators to 
make minor uses of other people’s copyright material 
for the purposes of parody, caricature or pastiche, 
without first asking for permission.”<?> Because our 
original data were collected in 2012 and had already 
undergone takedown effects before the introduction 
of the new legislation, we are unable to examine 
effects of the UK exception on takedown rate. The 
effect of policy change on right holder behavior is a 
potential direction for future research.
64 This study provides the first empirical analysis of 
YouTube takedown behavior combining information 
about content as well as stated policy of rightholders. 
The central finding is that rightholders appear to 
make complex choices that are assisted by automatic 
detection mechanisms, with little concern for 
the artistic integrity of the creative works they 
represent. The significant difference between 
musical genres suggests that rightholders, even in 
the same medium, behave quite differently from 
their peers. Further empirical research of tradeoffs 
between enforcement, innovation, and freedom of 
expression in online platforms is urgently needed. 
Our study maps a new methodological path how to 
do this.
Annex 1: Descriptive statistics for main variables
Min Max Mean Std. 
Deviation
Taken down (censored event) 0 1 .3469 .47612
Indicator of sales rank 0 .99 .6043 .20556
Number of views at time of 
January 2012 
1 26,856,003 130,543.547 1,064,833.044
Monetized dummy 0 1 .5856 .49274
Production values (1-5 scale) 1 5 3.0240 .99726
Highest production dummy 0 1 .3121 .46347
High production dummy 0 1 .2478 .43187
Average production dummy 0 1 .4041 .49086
Low production dummy 0 1 .2838 .45095
Parody type: target dummy 0 1 .3484 .47659
Parody type: weapon dummy 0 1 .3065 .46116
Parody type:  
mislabeled dummy
0 1 .3451 .47554
Highest severity of critique 
dummy
0 1 .0152 .12248
Music genre: pop dummy 0 1 .4448 .49708
Music genre: hip hop dummy 0 1 .3121 .46349
Music genre: rock dummy 0 1 .1648 .37107
Music genre: electro dummy 0 1 .0783 .26872
Territory: USA dummy 0 1 .7504 .43289
Territory: UK dummy 0 1 .1838 .38742
Major label dummy 0 1 .8124 .39050
Copied sound recording 
dummy
0 1 .77 .420
Copied video recording 
dummy
0 1 .01 .107
Parodist appear in video 
dummy
0 1 .7847 .41111
Female dummy 0 1 .1203 .32541
Time (Months) 13.00 72.00 59.904 17.507
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Annex 2: Cox proportional hazards analysis of the 
effects of video features on takedown rate
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Model: 
covariates
Commercial Cultural Moral/
Artistic
Behavior All factors
Sales rank 1.070 
(.736–1.554)
.989 
(.673–1.452)
Monetized 
dummy
1.209* 
(1.209–1.420)
1.135 
(.962–1.340)
Log views .854*** 
(.824–.885)
.864*** 
(.832–.898)
Production 
values
.901* 
(0.826–.984)
.898** 
(.819–.985)
Rock 
dummy
.600*** 
(.465–.774)
.560*** 
(.434–.724)
Electro 
dummy
1.143 
(.859–1.227)
1.058 
(.787–1.422)
Hip hop 
dummy
1.027 
(.859–1.227)
1.013 
(.861–1.236)
USA 
dummy
.640** 
(.471-.868)
.724*** 
(.604-.867)
UK dummy 1.010 
(.720–1.416)
Major label .954 
(.782–1.163)
.891 
(.729–1.090)
Weapon 
dummy
.613*** 
(.412–.809)
.908 
(.732–1.127)
Target 
dummy
.776** 
(.672–.994)
Severity of 
critique
.368* 
(.137–.988)
.504 
(.186–1.364)
Mislabeled 
dummy
1.425*** 
(1.213–1.674)
1.096 
(.908–1.322)
Parodist 
appears
.976 
(.804–1.185)
1.031 
(.844–1.259)
Parodist 
female
1.162 
(.917–1.472)
1.028 
(.809–1.307)
Copied 
sound rec
1.472*** 
(1.202–1.802)
1.237** 
(1.004–1.523)
Copied 
video rec
1.761* 
(.938–3.307)
1.212 
(.638–2.302)
Observa-
tions
1,839 1,839 1,839 1,839 1,839
Model AIC 8872.71 8959.53 8971.49 8809.66 8691.23
Notes: Values are exp(β) with 95% confidence intervals (lower-upper) in parentheses. 
Significance levels: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
